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From a socio-economic perspective, the ‘sharp end’ of climate research is very much
about looking forward in time. As far as possible, we need to know what to expect and
approximately when to expect it. However, it is argued here that our approach to climate
change (including its scientiﬁc basis and its policy implications) is ﬁrmly linked to our
understanding of the past. This is mainly due to the role played by palaeoclimate
reconstructions in shaping our expectations of the climate system, in particular via their
ability to test the accuracy of our climate models. Importantly, this includes the intuitive
models that each of us carries around in our mind, as well as the more complex numerical
models hiding inside supercomputers. It is through such models that palaeoclimate
insights may affect the scientiﬁc and political judgements that we must make in the face
of persistent and ultimately irreducible predictive uncertainty. Already we can
demonstrate a great deal of conﬁdence in our current understanding of the global
climate system based speciﬁcally on insights from the geological record. If further
advances are to be made effectively, climate models should take advantage of both past
and present constraints on their behaviour, and should be given added credence to the
extent that they are compatible with an increasingly rich tapestry of past climatic
phenomena. Furthermore, palaeoclimate data should be accompanied by clearly deﬁned
uncertainties, and organized in arrays that are capable of speaking directly to numerical
models, and their limitations in particular.
Keywords: palaeoclimatology; palaeoceanography; climate prediction;
public perception; uncertainty; judgementOn
*lu1. Selective doubt
In February 2008, a treasury committee called for the creation of a new post
in the British government: the Minister for Climate Change. This follows up
on the creation in 2006 of the Ofﬁce for Climate Change to coordinate
government policy and act as an advocate for climate change issues. The UK
is not alone in signalling the special political importance (at the very least) of
climate change: the Australian government, in a recent policy reversal, now
includes a department of climate change and appointed its ﬁrst Minister for
Climate Change and Water in December 2007. These developments may bePhil. Trans. R. Soc. A (2008) 366, 4627–4645
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global climate change. No doubt, part of the reason for this shift is that the
scientiﬁc assessment of climate change, coordinated by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), has become increasingly emphatic
(Solomon et al. 2007) and high proﬁle (Kerr & Kintisch 2007). The latest
IPCC assessment report has thus indicated scientiﬁc conﬁdence and consensus
that: (i) global temperatures are rising, (ii) this temperature increase and
attendant impacts are attributable to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions,
and (iii) previously accumulated and future emissions will contribute to
further global climate impacts (Pachauri & Reisinger 2007). The shift in
public discourse, and public mood, in response to the growing scientiﬁc
consensus is difﬁcult to characterize precisely. While a number of inﬂuential
people have publicly relinquished their apparent denial of the reality or
importance of global climate change (Brissenden 2006; MacAskill 2007),
others continue resolutely with their rejection of the scientiﬁc consensus.
The technique used by many deniers is what might be called ‘the manipulation
of uncertainty into selective doubt’. This takes advantage of scientiﬁc
uncertainty, for example uncertainty in predictions of global mean temperature,
in order to bias our assessment of climate predictions in an unscientiﬁc way. That
is, it aims either to create the impression that our theories have no predictive
power at all or to form the prejudice or unconscious assumption that only part of
the existing range of scientiﬁc uncertainty needs to be considered seriously. This
technique therefore seeks to encourage selective expectations, for example, of no
signiﬁcant change in climate, generally on the basis of prevailing social mores or
proposed economic imperatives (e.g. short-term personal gain). Thus, there is no
scientiﬁc basis for the assertion made by Lawson (2006) that ‘while the prospect
of catastrophic consequences from global warming cannot be regarded as
impossible, nor can [the possibility] . that over the next hundred years or so,
the world might enter a new ice age’. Nevertheless, with this equivocation,
Lawson appears to wish to induce the selective expectation that cooling is
equally plausible as warming (and therefore presumably no change at all),
regardless of the available scientiﬁc evidence. We are thus encouraged to believe
that climate scientists essentially know nothing about future climate
and should therefore be ignored, or lampooned as priests in the ‘new religion
of eco-fundamentalism’ (Lawson 2006).
In his 1963 lecture, This Unscientiﬁc Age, Richard Feynman characterized the
process of becoming convinced of telepathy (of which he was in serious doubt) as
one of overcoming prejudice. Feynman had a method, and importantly an
enthusiasm, for overcoming his self-proclaimed prejudice against telepathy if at
all possible, not least owing to the very serious implications of telepathy for his
ﬁeld of study, physics. The method in question is the scientiﬁc method, which
operates by applying constraints from experiment and observation to eliminate
prejudice as far as possible (e.g. Popper 1963). The bottom line in Feynman’s
anecdote is that a proposition is not incorrect because it is uncertain or more
unlikely because it carries major consequences. Rather a proposition gains
credibility to the extent that it cannot be shown to be inconsistent with as many
other mutually consistent beliefs as possible. Indeed, because uncertainty can
never be completely eliminated, the best we can do, in principle and practice, is
to diligently cross-check the mutual consistency of our theories to an extent thatPhil. Trans. R. Soc. A (2008)
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Wittgenstein 1975). Some of these judgements may be scientiﬁc assessments of
‘the balance of evidence’, while others may constitute policy recommendations.
In the latter case, it is possible that our judgements may incorporate more
criteria than are provided by science alone. Personal or social values may
certainly colour the application of scientiﬁc knowledge in political decisions.
Nevertheless, any political decision that fails to take full account of the scientiﬁc
evidence, through manipulation or selective interpretation, cannot be called
reasonable (even if it may be well calculated).
These considerations are relevant to the recurrent public/media misunder-
standing/manipulation of the scientiﬁc uncertainty associated with climate change
predictions, because they underline the fact that all knowledge (even rigorously
tested knowledge) is framed by a degree of uncertainty, in spite of which we must
still make reasoned scientiﬁc and political judgements. Most importantly, we are
reminded that we must treat this type of uncertainty differently from the
uncertainty of a dice roll. A more lucid analysis of this issue has been provided by
McIntyre (2007), who has likened our journey into the Anthropocene to that of a car
speeding into the fog along an unfamiliar and unmapped, twisty road (McIntyre
1997). We all know what we would do in these circumstances; we would drive
cautiously and slowly if possible. But why should we do this? Why do we not settle
the matter on the toss of a coin instead (anything could lie ahead: heads I speed up,
tails I slow down)? Clearly, it has to do with an evaluation of the penalties
associated with forming incorrect expectations. Unless we have been able to repeat
an experiment (e.g. future climate) numerous times, it is likely that we will have to
evaluate the penalties associated with incorrect predictions on the basis of some
pertinent set of experiences. This is one reason for the defensibility of the
precautionary principle, which need not be timid or without ambition (as the
Machiavellian political tradition may testify). Indeed, it is worth noting that
precaution can be applied to either action or inaction: precaution itself is hardly a
questionable principle.
If we (the public) are to be given a clear and truthful picture of the uncertainty
of climate prediction, and more importantly are to evaluate sensibly the choices
that the spectre of climate change presents to us, it is imperative that we are able
to see the point of the ‘McIntyre foggy road’ simile. Of course, it is also desirable
to dispel the fog itself, and narrow our scientiﬁc uncertainties as much as
possible. In this perspective, I try to argue that both of these goals are eminently
well served by the exposure and analysis of the Earth’s past. The history of
global climate may serve as a unique pedagogic tool, cautionary tale and
calibration metric. The sum of useful knowledge certainly does not lie in the past,
but our understanding of the climate system (whether intuitive or objective)
would be greatly impoverished without the retrospective provided by the
palaeoclimate archive.2. Looking back to the future
If there is one central value of palaeoclimate reconstruction (with regard to
future climate prediction), it is surely its ability to show us what aspects of the
climate system we really do not understand well enough. It has been said that thePhil. Trans. R. Soc. A (2008)
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the unknown’ (Berlin 1996). The value of such groping should not be
underestimated, as it informs the content and accuracy of our climate models.
This applies to the ‘intuitive models’ that we all carry around in our minds, as
well as the complex numerical representations of physical reality that are hidden
away in computers. It is through a hierarchy of models of this breadth that
the history of past climate change can inform our expectations of the climate
system, either by calibrating our climate extrapolations and parametrizations or
by surprising us with phenomena that are not observed today and remain
difﬁcult to explain.(a ) A pedagogic tool
In the public sphere, insights from the past can help to determine how we
receive climate change predictions, and in particular how we treat the
uncertainty of these predictions. The climate records shown in ﬁgure 1 may be
used to illustrate this point. At the very most, the clear and consistent link
shown in ﬁgure 1 between changing atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2)
concentrations and changing global climate over the last ca 800 000 years
might be taken to provide a rough (if rather unreliable) ‘statistical’ model of the
global climate (Wolff et al. 2005). However, this sort of model has no physical
content: correlation is not a proof of causation. Nevertheless, the impact of
viewing anthropogenic CO2 projections within a long-term geological context as
shown in ﬁgure 1 is unmistakeable: we (the public) are compelled to take
questions about the future seriously, and may be motivated to ﬁnd out more
about the climate system as a result. If records such as those shown in ﬁgure 1
are able to compel the public to engage with the science of climate change, and
to listen seriously and critically to the analyses of the risks associated with
climate change, then they would have performed an invaluable task (perhaps the
most challenging).
The compelling nature of global climate history is further illustrated by
recurrent reference to the past in public debate. Unfortunately, however, this
often amounts to a manipulation of palaeoclimate evidence to insinuate a sort of
‘plus c¸a change’ theory of global climate (e.g. Lawson 2006; Lomborg 2007).
Some examples of past climatic phenomena that have been misconstrued as
evidence against an anthropogenic inﬂuence on climate (or against the
signiﬁcance of such an inﬂuence) include: (i) the rise of Northern Hemisphere
temperatures since the Little Ice Age (ca 400–200 years ago), implying a non-
anthropogenic explanation for warming, (ii) the fact that atmospheric CO2
started to increase slightly after Antarctic temperatures across past deglacia-
tions, implying CO2 may be a passive climate parameter, and (iii) the fact that a
glacial period should ‘naturally’ occur at some point in the future, thus either
counteracting or justifying any anthropogenic warming.
The ﬁrst two of these examples have been used to argue that, if global climate
could change irrespective of atmospheric CO2 in the past, then CO2 must not
have a signiﬁcant impact on global climate. This argument is a logical fallacy, in
that it operates by ‘denying the antecedent’ (it infers a lack of causation under
the false premise of a single causal pathway, as in the ﬂawed argument that ‘if it
rains the ground is wet; the ground is wet; therefore it is raining’). Regardless ofPhil. Trans. R. Soc. A (2008)
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Figure 1. Anthropogenic CO2, in the context of climate changes over the last 800 000 years. Time
axis approaches the present from right to left. Plots show, from top to bottom: (i) dust content of
Antarctic ice, suggesting variable supply and/or transport to Antarctica (Lambert et al. 2008),
(ii) terrestrial vegetation changes recorded in Greece, indicating alternating dry glacials and more
temperate interglacials in southern Europe (Tzedakis et al. 2006), (iii) stable oxygen isotope
fractionation of oxygen gas trapped in Antarctic ice, indicating changes in land-based ice volume,
as well as changes in the balance of marine and terrestrial photosynthesis or ‘Dole effect’ (Petit
et al. 1999), (iv) stable oxygen isotope fractionation of marine calcite, also indicating changes in
land-based ice volume, but including changes in deep-water temperature (black line) (Lisiecki &
Raymo 2005), with a record of past Northern Hemisphere summer insolation variability superposed
(grey sinusoidal line) (Shackleton 2000), (v) Antarctic temperature, as indicated by stable
hydrogen isotope fractionation of Antarctic ice (Jouzel et al. 2007), uncorrected for source effects
(Cuffey & Vimeux 2001), (vi) atmospheric methane (CH4) variability, up to pre-industrial times
only, and (vii) atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) variability (Siegenthaler et al. 2005), including
anthropogenic post-industrial era emissions (www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends), and projected
CO2 levels due to future emissions (Nakicenovic et al. 2000). Differences between the two sea-level
proxies (d18Oatm and d
18Om) illustrate the challenge involved in generating accurate long-term ice-
volume reconstructions (Shackleton 2000). Note the greatly extended axis for atmospheric CO2
(y -axis on the left-hand side): atmospheric CO2 has already increased by as much as glacial–
interglacial variability due to post-industrial emissions and projected increases are approximately
2–10 times as large.
4631Facing future climate changethis logical fallacy, palaeoclimate reconstructions, in conjunction with numerical
models, have shown that while natural (solar and volcanic) forcing of pre-
industrial climate can indeed explain the Little Ice Age (and the preceding
Medieval Warm Period, ca 900–700 years ago), only anthropogenic forcing can
adequately explain the extent and rate of post-industrial warming (Jansen et al.
2007). Reconstructions of ‘palaeo-forcing’ are therefore perfectly consistent withPhil. Trans. R. Soc. A (2008)
L. Skinner4632both the palaeoclimate response and the anthropogenic warming. That is, we
understand the forcing of the last millennium, and the same forcing cannot
account for observed post-industrial climate change.
If our understanding of the last millennium is quite tidy, our understanding of
glacial–interglacial cycles remains much less so. Since the nineteenth century, it
has been suspected that both atmospheric CO2 concentrations and insolation
(the changing exposure of the Earth’s surface to solar radiation, due to changes
in the Earth’s orbit) have played important roles in forcing past glacial–
interglacial cycles (Bard 2004). More than 100 years later, we are still lacking a
complete synthesis of the processes responsible for past glaciations and
deglaciations. Nevertheless, it is quite certain that both processes must have
operated through external (insolation) forcing combined with internal (CO2 and
albedo) feedbacks (Jansen et al. 2007). This consensus has emerged primarily
from the analysis of ice-core and marine palaeoclimate reconstructions
(Shackleton 2000; Paillard 2006; Ruddiman 2006a,b). It underlines the
nonlinearity of the deglacial process (Imbrie & Imbrie 1980), which would
appear to involve a bistable switching mechanism (Parrenin & Paillard 2003)
whereby a threshold amount of Antarctic warming could play a triggering role
(Knorr & Lohmann 2007). All of this is the subject of ongoing research.
Nevertheless, the fact that Antarctic warming preceded atmospheric CO2 rise
across past deglaciations implies neither logically nor in principle that CO2 had a
passive role in the deglacial process. Rather it underlines emphatically the
sensitivity of the climate system to internal feedbacks, including in particular the
adjustment of the carbon cycle.
The observation that glacial–interglacial climate changes almost certainly
relied on carbon cycle feedbacks makes the proposition that a Northern
Hemisphere glaciation is impending or overdue particularly intriguing (the
third example listed above). This suggestion has been linked to two possible
implications: that anthropogenic warming will soon be reversed naturally, or will
have prevented a glacial future. Contrary to the ﬁrst proposition, it has been
suggested based on past relationships between Antarctic temperature, atmos-
pheric CO2 and insolation that the present interglacial would have naturally
lasted at least another 20 000 years (Berger & Loutre 2002; Loutre 2003). This
would mimic what occurred the last time that the Earth’s orbit was in a
conﬁguration similar to the present, during Marine Isotope Stage 11, ca 420 000
years ago (Loutre & Berger 2003). Under this interpretation, anthropogenic
effects would not be counteracted by a ‘natural’ glacial cycle any time soon. The
second proposition (inconsistent with the ﬁrst) that anthropogenic warming may
have postponed the next glacial is a trickier one. It has drawn support from the
hypothesis that signiﬁcant anthropogenic effects on climate began to accrue well
before the industrial era, thus preventing an early glaciation and presumably
contributing to the development of human civilization within a warm and
relatively stable climatic context (Ruddiman & Thomson 2001; Ruddiman et al.
2005). Although the latter hypothesis is hotly debated (Broecker & Stocker 2006;
Masson-Delmotte et al. 2006), conceptual models that are based on reconstructed
palaeoclimate relationships suggest that the next glaciation could in principle be
delayed as a result of modern anthropogenic emissions (Archer & Ganopolski
2005). Therefore, regardless of whether the ‘postponed early glaciation’
hypothesis is correct or not, the ability of human civilization to affect globalPhil. Trans. R. Soc. A (2008)
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the next glaciation through its impact on greenhouse gas concentrations, then
the modern industrial era will inevitably pack a far greater punch. The most
important question is therefore not whether a global glaciation is upon us (it is
not), but just how warm and/or unstable the extended interglacial period ahead
will be. If the future is anything similar to the last exceptionally long interglacial
period (MIS 11), then sea level might be expected to rise by tens of metres
(Hearty et al. 1999; Kindler & Hearty 2000). Although we cannot at present be
sure of this sea-level extrapolation, we should consider it seriously given that
global mean temperature has probably already risen halfway to MIS 11 levels
since pre-industrial times (Hansen et al. 2006).
The few examples provided above illustrate how a clear and correct exposure
of the Earth’s past may provide the public with a robust and balanced
perspective on the nature of climate forcing and feedbacks, demonstrating both
the limitations of our knowledge of the climate system and the consistency of
anthropogenic warming with a host of past climatic phenomena. This use of the
palaeoclimate archive appears to have been taken up to great effect by the
internet site http://www.realclimate.org.(b ) Calibrations and cautionary tales
The inﬂuence of the palaeoclimate perspective is not restricted to the public
sphere of course. In addition to shaping the prejudices of the public (to use
Feynman’s term), palaeoclimate reconstructions can also inﬂuence climate
scientists in a more objective, if also less immediate, way by: (i) pointing up
speciﬁc aspects of the climate system that need to be further developed in our
numerical and conceptual models and (ii) directly testing the generality of
climate model behaviour. Records of past climate variability can therefore hint
at what ‘knobs’ might be missing from our numerical models and if they might
need tweaking.
In general, palaeoclimate studies that aim to inform on climate systematics
and future climate prediction will either represent ‘calibrations’ or ‘cautionary
tales’. Both approaches can provide invaluable information that might not be
obtained otherwise, although both are also subject to distinct limitations.
Palaeoclimate calibrations usually aim to provide assessments of ‘dangerous’
increments in various climate parameters. However, this is usually achieved by
assuming a stationary calibration with respect to climate parameters that have
not been taken into account or are assumed to remain constant (e.g. insolation,
cloud cover, atmospheric dust concentration, vegetation distribution, etc. .).
Notably, this type of approach has been used to estimate the expected effects of
incremental global warming on ice-sheet stability and sea level (Hansen et al.
2006; Overpeck et al. 2006). More commonly, palaeoclimate reconstructions
provide cautionary tales that are used to illustrate complex climate processes or
speciﬁc climate events, without necessarily providing a precise description of all
the physical mechanisms at work. One important example of this type of
contribution is the illustration of thresholds or tipping points in the climate
system. Without the geological archive of past climate variability, we would have
no grounded notion of all the tipping elements, and respective tipping points,
that might exist in the climate system, and still less be able to evaluate themPhil. Trans. R. Soc. A (2008)
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Figure 2. Abrupt global climate change during the last glacial period. Top plots show proxy
estimates of past changes in Greenland temperature, indicated by stable oxygen isotope
fractionation in Greenland ice (grey line) (Johnsen et al. 2001), and deep-ocean circulation in
the Northeast Atlantic, indicated by the stable carbon isotope fractionation in the bottom-dwelling
foraminifer Planulina wullerstorﬁi (purple line) (Skinner et al. 2007). Middle plots show Antarctic
ice-core records of Antarctic temperature, as indicated by stable hydrogen isotope fractionation in
Antarctic ice (grey line) (Jouzel et al. 2007), and atmospheric CO2 (black line) (Indermuhle et al.
2000; Monnin et al. 2001). Bottom plots show reconstructed sea-level variability, based on a
compilation of absolutely dated corals and shelf deposits (since 21 000 years before present)
(Lambeck & Chappell 2001) and Red Sea stable oxygen isotope modelling (Siddall et al. 2003)
(dotted grey line, with ﬁve-point smoothed solid purple line); and inferred rates of sea-level change
(black-ﬁlled line). Care must be taken in interpreting the precise relative timing of these archives.
The prevailing (yet still debated) paradigm is that the records shown here are linked through ice-
sheet instability thresholds and resulting ocean circulation-mediated changes in Atlantic heat
transport (EPICA community members 2006).
L. Skinner4634sensibly (Overpeck & Webb 2000; Alley et al. 2003; Lenton et al. 2008).
Of course, at the same time, without numerical models our interpretation of
the ‘tipping mechanisms’ that operate in the climate system would equally
be limited.
An example of past threshold behaviour is illustrated in ﬁgure 2, which shows
past sea level and climate change since ca 70 000 years before present. These
records demonstrate a fascinating aspect of our climate system that could not
have been discovered or characterized effectively through direct observation and
theorizing alone: the Earth’s capacity for intense and abrupt changes in climatePhil. Trans. R. Soc. A (2008)
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instabilities and greenhouse gas ﬂuctuations, and were telecommunicated across
the globe, affecting monsoon systems, tropical rain belts and vegetation
distribution (Wang et al. 2001, 2006; Sanchez Goni et al. 2002; Hughen et al.
2004). The world in which these impressive climate changes occurred was clearly
very different from today, and we know that this played a major role in their
occurrence (e.g. McManus et al. 1999; Schulz et al. 2002). Nevertheless, the
records shown in ﬁgure 2 provide a unique ‘laboratory’ in which speciﬁc theories
of climate variability can be tested. Climate theory, as encapsulated in a given
model, can hardly be called general if it is not compatible with the full range of
past climate behaviour. Arguably, this should apply to climate behaviour during
both warmer and colder regimes, even if it is a warmer regime that we may
expect to inhabit in the future.
Notably, we are still unable to explain adequately (i.e. simulate) the type of
changes that are illustrated in ﬁgure 2. This is perhaps most worrying in the case
of rapid sea-level ﬂuctuations (Chappell 2002; Siddall et al. 2003, 2008), which
occurred over several centuries and were linked to regional temperature swings
and rain belt transitions that were effected within a mere decade (Wang et al.
2006; Svensson et al. 2008). The point is not that the past will necessarily repeat
itself, but that our climate theories are not so general or complete as to
encompass climate adjustments under different boundary conditions from
today’s. Of course, a distinction can be made between ‘complete models’ and
‘adequate models’: greater complexity need not result in greater predictive
accuracy. Nevertheless, it is crucial that we assess objectively what constitutes a
model that is adequately complete. The past may help in this regard by revealing
unexpected feedback mechanisms or teleconnections. Insights of this nature
become especially valuable when they bear on mechanisms that generate
threshold behaviour or enhanced sensitivity in the climate system. One is
reminded of the McIntyre foggy road simile described above (McIntyre 1997); we
can probably afford to be ignorant of small risks, but we cannot afford to
misevaluate veritable catastrophes (Oppenheimer & Alley 2005). The long-term
history of ice-sheet instability underlines our increasingly worrying uncertainty
regarding the rate of Greenland Ice Sheet and West Antarctic Ice Sheet
destruction (Witze 2008), and highlights the upper uncertainty limit of the most
recent IPCC sea-level predictions (Hansen 2005). Precisely because of theoretical
limitations (Solomon et al. 2007), these IPCC predictions were unable to
incorporate the type of ice-sheet dynamics that probably contributed to the
palaeoclimate archive (albeit under very different conditions), and that are now
becoming apparent through direct observation (Zwally et al. 2002; Rignot et al.
2004; Rignot & Kanagaratnam 2006).(c ) Model testing
It has been argued above that the confrontation of palaeoclimate reconstruc-
tions with theory-based simulations may point up aspects of climate theory that
require urgent attention and improvement. These improvements can very often
be achieved without further recourse to palaeoclimate information, through
additional work in the laboratory, in the ﬁeld or at the blackboard. However, in
some instances, they may also be achieved through a direct test of modelPhil. Trans. R. Soc. A (2008)
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climate system will always be inaccurate to some degree. In large part, this is
because models necessarily have a limited ‘structure’, or scope of representation
(Smith 2002; Stainforth et al. 2007). Restrictions on temporal and spatial scales
in physical climate models are obvious examples. Slab oceans, simple energy
balance atmospheres, abiotic worlds, static vegetation and uniformly parame-
trized oceanic ‘eddy diffusion’ are further examples of very useful simpliﬁcations
that can result in informative and predictive models of some form. Uncertainties
in model predictions can, and do, arise from structural simpliﬁcations such as
these (Smith 2002; Stainforth et al. 2007). In highly complex global climate
models, uncertainties also arise from parametrizations (‘knob settings’) and
inherent chaotic behaviour, both of which may be tackled without speciﬁc
geological hindsight (Stainforth et al. 2005, 2007; Knight et al. 2007). However, if
we are to assess the degree to which model truncations may result in
qualitatively impaired behaviour, access to independent historical information
is imperative. For diurnal or seasonal processes, direct observations obviously
provide a basis for veriﬁcation and improvement of model behaviour. However,
for climatic phenomena, which by deﬁnition operate on larger spatial and/or
temporal scales, the longer term (geological) perspective cannot be ignored. This
is especially true for the evaluation of climatic phenomena that are not already
directly observed today. The Palaeoclimate Modeling Intercomparison Projects
(PMIP and PMIP2) and the palaeoclimate extension of the Quantifying
Uncertainties in Model Prediction project (PalaeoQUMP) are examples of
palaeoclimate data–model comparisons that ultimately aim to improve climate
simulation abilities (Joussaume & Taylor 2000; Edwards et al. 2007). In this
context, it is worth noting that model veriﬁcation is strictly only valuable (in
a Popperian sense) when it fails, as long as we are able to manage the implica-
tions of this failure to the beneﬁt of our collective judgements (Hulme 2007).
This underlines the use of testing models where they are the weakest, ﬁrst
and foremost.
Clearly, the relationship between climate prediction (climate theory) and
palaeoclimate reconstruction involves some mutual reliance. If reconstructions of
past climate behaviour are to inﬂuence climate theory, and eventually our
predictions, it must be through the intermediary of numerical modelling. However,
this is not only because numerical models can provide physical interpretations of
palaeoclimate data, but also because models require a diversity of data for their
justiﬁcation and improvement, particularly when the theory incorporated in
numerical models remains incomplete or is truncated in the interest of numerical
tractability. It is the margins of our predictive abilities that require the most
attention if our theories are to be developed further, and palaeoclimate data are
probably best suited to test models at the edge of their ability.3. Looking forward in palaeoclimate research
In §2, it was argued that palaeoclimate reconstructions affect our understanding
of climate change on two levels: ﬁrstly through effective public engagement and
secondly through a dialogue with numerical climate models and the climate
systematics that they incorporate. The ﬁrst of these channels could suggest aPhil. Trans. R. Soc. A (2008)
4637Facing future climate changeuseful role for the ‘historical turn’ in the education and communication of
science, including the science of climate change. History is perhaps the most
captivating form of non-ﬁction, and when recounted analytically is especially
good at illustrating how to cope with predictive uncertainty. This is a point often
made, and expressed most clearly, by social historians (Hobsbawm 1981). The
past, perhaps through its combination of immediate cogency and persistent
opacity, demonstrates very nicely how the unknown abuts the known, and how
we can (and very often do) make sound judgements on the basis of limited
knowledge. In this sense, the past provides a wealth of ‘priors’ for the
unconscious modelling of the risks of climate change (i.e. for informing public
perception and judgement), and for the more deliberate design of coping
strategies that are premised on uncertainty (Dessai & Hulme 2004).
The importance of the dialogue between palaeoclimatology and numerical
modelling has implications for both modellers and palaeoclimatologists. For
theoreticians and modellers, these are relatively straightforward: a model or
theory is not strictly general, and may not be adequate for many applications, if
it is unable to explain past climatic phenomena, especially those that surprise us.
This does not imply that all climate models should be run out for several
millennia or subjected to ‘hosing experiments’ that simulate massive glacial-era
iceberg discharges into the North Atlantic. Rather, it might imply a piecemeal
analysis of key elements of the climate system and their sensitivity to different
forcing and boundary conditions. First and foremost, this should involve the
investigation of ‘tipping elements’ and their thresholds in the climate system
(Lenton et al. 2008), for which observational data come primarily from the
palaeoclimate archive (Overpeck & Webb 2000; Alley et al. 2003; Hansen et al.
2006). In this way, palaeoclimate insights would help to decide which models
might be inadequately complete to be truly predictive (it will be much more
difﬁcult to decide which models are adequate (see, for example, Knutti 2008)).
For palaeoclimatologists, the dialogue with numerical modelling requires that
data should be produced and/or arranged in arrays that are able to speak
directly to numerical models, and their weaknesses in particular. The goal should
be to provide robust criteria (as explicit deliverables) for the evaluation and
improvement of model behaviour. Arguably, the greatest strength of palaeocli-
mate reconstruction is not so much in the provision of precise quantitative data
(e.g. temperature ﬁelds or threshold values) as in the illustration of robust
qualitative test criteria. Most notably, this includes relational properties, such as
the phasing of climate parameters or the sign of spatial gradients and temporal
trends. These might at ﬁrst appear to be blunt instruments for testing highly
complex climate models, but they are in fact fundamental to any analysis of
causal processes. The key point here is that the mechanisms responsible for a
particular climate state are not necessarily veriﬁed by calibrating the realism of
that state. One can get the picture right for the wrong reasons, since precision
of representation does not guarantee accuracy of explanation. This problem of
‘equiﬁnality’ is why models that produce consistent equilibrium states need not
respond to perturbations in the same qualitative way (Beven 2002).
Some speciﬁc recommendations can be made in the ﬁeld of palaeoceanography,
where relational criteria will typically comprise either two spatial dimensions or
a spatial dimension and a time dimension (i.e. where we can either produce proxy
maps or arrays of proxy time series). Given limitations on resources, and on thePhil. Trans. R. Soc. A (2008)
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Figure 3. (a) Hovmo¨ller diagram reproduced from Sarnthein et al. (2000), showing changes in
North Atlantic deep-water d13C (a proxy indicator of deep-ocean circulation change) through time
and across water depth. (b) The CLIMAP reconstruction of August sea-surface temperature
changes relative to present (contours of 28C), based on census counts of planktonic foraminifera
species preserved in deep-sea sediments from the height of the last glacial period (CLIMAP Project
Members 1976). Figure (a) contains a time dimension, while (b) does not.
L. Skinner4638time available to deploy these resources (i.e. to report results), one could argue
that the most efﬁcient way of providing robust relational test criteria speciﬁcally
for numerical ocean models would be to focus on ‘space–time property’ plots,
rather than maps. One example of such a diagram, based on palaeoceanographic
data (Sarnthein et al. 2000), is reproduced in ﬁgure 3a, alongside the pioneering
CLIMAP reconstruction of glacial age sea-surface temperatures in the Atlantic
(ﬁgure 3b). A conjecture (not proven rigorously here) is that there are fewer
causal pathways that may account for ﬁgure 3a than can account for ﬁgure 3b. If
true, this would not detract from map reconstructions such as CLIMAP, but it
would illustrate an important point of principle and of pragmatism by
emphasizing the value of temporal (causal) constraints. Furthermore, it isPhil. Trans. R. Soc. A (2008)
4639Facing future climate changeworth considering just how difﬁcult it can be to align distal palaeoclimate records
chronostratigraphically for the purposes of selecting ‘time slices’ to map out,
especially if one is dealing with high-resolution records of non-identical abrupt
changes. The challenge is ampliﬁed further if investment in time-series resolution
must be sacriﬁced in favour of investment in spatial coverage, as is often the case.
It would therefore be extremely difﬁcult to generate just two maps of the
Atlantic Ocean, one for a North Atlantic stadial (cold event) and one for the
subsequent interstadial (warm event). Indeed, this could not be realized
adequately using the existing data. By contrast, the challenge of precisely aligning
records within a more localized region (such as a water depth transect) is greatly
reduced. At the same time, more useful metrics can be provided for data–model
comparisons. Hence, while the type of data shown in ﬁgure 3b might give us some
indication of what things were similar to those in the past, the type of data shown
in ﬁgure 3amight also be able to suggest how they came to be that way. One might
therefore propose that palaeoceanographers should spend more time generating
space–time property diagrams (currently, only a handful exist). Of course, many
would argue that palaeoceanographers should simply spend more time generating
temporal or spatial arrays of any type at all. Although one cannot argue with this
suggestion, limitations on resources will inevitably require us to make choices in
order to optimize our efﬁciency and scientiﬁc impact. Part of the rationale behind
the proposition made here is that, in addition to explicitly focusing greater
attention on the fundamental importance of stratigraphic correlations and
chronologies, signiﬁcant jumps in our understanding of the ocean–climate system
are much more likely to be achieved each time disparate space–time property
diagrams are synchronized or compared with model outputs.
One further implication that arises from the palaeoclimate–numerical model
dialogue in particular concerns both model simulations and palaeoclimate
reconstructions alike. This is the need for greater emphasis to be placed on the
deﬁnition (i.e. the classiﬁcation and, if possible, quantiﬁcation) of simulation and
proxy data uncertainty. This requirement does not amount to the simple
addition of error bars on proxy data. Rather it refers to a more pressing need for
dedicated statistical methods (yet to be developed and widely disseminated in
the modelling and palaeoclimate communities) that are able to deal with the
complex and often unquantiﬁable uncertainties inherent in climate extrapol-
ations (Stainforth et al. 2007). It is important to note that, while being derived
from contrasting principles, model forecasts and proxy reconstructions can
actually incorporate very similar types of uncertainty. Proxies are models of
climate parameters after all. The most obvious parallels are between model
‘inadequacies’ (e.g. crude parametrizations, or the complete lack of climate
components) (Stainforth et al. 2007) and proxy ‘biases’ (e.g. habitat variability
or physiological plasticity) (Bauch et al. 2003; Skinner & Elderﬁeld 2005). Both
of these types of uncertainty bear on the perils of extrapolation, and neither is
easily quantiﬁed, let alone explicitly characterized. For example, one cannot
always say how the seasonal or depth habitat of a foraminifer proxy carrier has
changed through time, even if one knows that it did. This would mean that we
could not say what aspect of the climate the proxy was sampling. As a result of
these fundamental limitations on uncertainty quantiﬁcation, the replication of
results (multiplying our simulations and reconstructions) will become increas-
ingly important. It is likely that, in the future, much greater attention will bePhil. Trans. R. Soc. A (2008)
L. Skinner4640focused on the formulation and communication of uncertainty in a manner that
allows our prior expectations (which may not actually be ‘known’) to be usefully
declared and therefore objectively manipulated (e.g. Buck & Millard 2004).
In summary, the past certainly is relevant to how we face up to the prospect of
future climate change. Primarily, its relevance resides in its inﬂuence on the
judgements that we make, whether these are intuitive or scientiﬁc judgements of
what constitutes cause for concern or objective assessments of where extra research
efforts should be focused. Palaeoclimate insights can also have a more direct
inﬂuence on climate systematics to the extent that they inform our numerical
models of the climate system. Given the unique nature of anthropogenic forcing
relative to the immense diversity of past climatic conditions, probably only a subset
of the climatic insights provided by palaeoclimate reconstructions will be of direct
relevance to our immediate predictive needs. Nevertheless, everything we learn
about past climate dynamics contributes directly to our knowledge of the climate
system, and as such contributes to the foundations of any numerical model that
seeks to be sufﬁciently complete, as well as adequately predictive. For scientists and
the wider public alike, history may thus provide an invaluable antidote to both
explanatory hubris and fanciful speculation.
The author is grateful for a set of very constructive reviews, which helped greatly to improve
the clarity of an earlier draft. Interesting and motivating discussions with members of the
RETRO cruise (Marion Dufesne 2008), including E. Marais and T. Dokken, in particular, are also
greatly appreciated.References
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